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INTRODUCTION
The Gulf of Maine area, including Georges Bank, has long
been regarded as an area of special interest and importance
to United States' fishermen. The riches of Georges Bank were
known to New England fishermen in the 18th century, and early
in the 19th century, fishermen from Gloucester, Massachusetts
developed the halibut fishery on the Bank. Later the
emphasis shifted to cod and haddock, and the fishermen sailed
from a number of New England's ports including Boston and New
Bedford. Throughout the 19th century and until the 1950's
the Georges Bank fishery was exclusively the province of New
England fisherrnen. l
However, in the 1960's, large factory fleets from the
Soviet Union and Japan began to invade the waters of Georges
Bank. The freedom to fish on the high seas was cited as
justification for interfering with the U.s. fishermen. The
wave of newcomers also included Canadian fishermen who, as a
result of government subsidies, were able to under-sell U.S.
fishermen in American markets. 2 The competition both on the
waters and in the market place was devasting to the New
England fisheries industry and additionally c aused serious
depletions in a number of important fish stocks.
These developments led the United States to join the
growing number of coastal nations that were extending their
fisheries jurisdiction out to 2 0 0 nautical miles. Until 1977
Canada and the United States had only claimed fisheries
1
jurisdiction out to 12 nautical miles. Accordingly, fishing
on Georges Bank was governed by international law and
considered a freedom of the high seas. However, the Truman
Proclamation of 1945 stated that the continental shelf of the
United States extended to the 200-meter isobath. Under the
Proclamation the entire Georges Bank area was incorporated as
a nautral prolongation of the United States. Since there was
no practical need to define a continental shelf boundary
until recently, no steps were taken to resolve the issue
until the late 1970's when it became apparent that both the
United States and Canada were moving towards the extension of
fisheries jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles.
2
THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
The first formal definition of a continental shelf was
that of an international committee reported by J. D.Wiseman
and C. D. Ovey in 1952. 3 The continental shelf is "the zone
around the continent extending from the low water line to the
depth at which there is a marked increase of slope to greater
depth. Where this increase occurs the term shelf edge is
appropriate. Conventionally, the edge is taken at 100
fathoms (or 200 meters) but instances are known where the
increase of slope occurs at more than 200 or less than 65
fathoms. ,,4
The Convention on the Continental Shelf expanded the
definition of a continental shelf in 1958. Article 1 of the
Convention referred to the continental shelf as:
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas adjacent to the coast but outside the
area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200
meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth
of the superjacent waters admits of the ex-
ploitation of the natural resources of the said
areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoi 1 0 f simi 1ar
submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of
iSlands. 5
Definitions prior to 1958 ignored the outer limits of
the shelf because these limits were then economically
unimportant and thought unlikely to be reached by
3
exploitation in the near future. 6 The 1958 Convention,
supplying the first definition that included the outer
limits, extended the shelf to 200 meters or the maximum
exploitable depth.
Since 1958, knowledge of the continental shelf and
exploitation technologies have advanced. Coastal nations
pushed for a wider and deeper belt of sovereignty over the
resources of the shelf. The simplest way of widening the
belt appeared to be that of redefining the term continental
shelf. The U.N. Third Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS
III - 1982) accomplished that objection.
Article 76 of UNCLOS III redefined the continental shelf
of a country as the "seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the
natural prlongation of its land territory to the outer edge
of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical
miles. ,,7 The Article continued by supplying a provision in
paragraph 4 (a) for continental shelves that extend beyond 200
miles ..
The coastal state shall establish the outer
edge of the continental margin wherever the
margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles ..
by either
(i) a line delineated... to the outermost
fixed points at each of which the thickness of
sedimentary rocks is at least 1 per cent of
the shortest distance from such point to the
4
foot of the continental slope; or
(ii) a line delineated. . to fixed points
not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot
of the continental slope. 8
In simple terms, the preceeding excerpts mean that the
continental shelf is the farthest oceanward of the following:
(1) 200 nautical miles from the shore, or (2) the point at
which the thickness of sediments is less than 1 percent of
the distance to the base of the continental slope (known as
"Irish rule") or (3) 60 nautical miles from the base of the
continental slope ("Hedberg rule"). However, the continental
shelf cannot extend indefinitely. Paragraph 5 of Article 76
limits the continental shelf to 350 nautical miles or 100
nautical miles from the 2,500 meter isobath. 9
At the present time, this U.N. supplied, five-fold
definition is considered the legal definition of the
continental shelf. 1 0
5
TRUMAN PROCLAMATION
The Truman Proclamation of 28 September 1945, which was
the first recognized assertion of jurisdiction over the
resources of the continental shelf, declared:
Having concern for the urgency of conserving
anq prudently utilizing its natural resources,
the Government of the United States regards
the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed
of the continental shelf beneath the high
seas but contiguous to the coasts of the
United States as appertaining to the United
States, subject to its jurisdiction and
control .... The character as high seas
of the waters above the continental shelf
and the right to their free and unimpeded
11
navigation are in no way thus affected.
The Truman Proclamation recognized that assertion of
jurisdiction over the continental shelf necessarily would
entail determination of continental shelf boundaries with
neighboring states. The Proclamation stated that in cases
where the continental shelf was shared with opposite or
adjacent states, the boundary would be determined by
negotiation between the United States and the concerned
d . h . b .. I 12nation in accor ance Wlt equlta Ie prlnclp es.
In addition, prior to issuing the Proclamation, the United
States formally not ified the governments of Mexico, Canada,
6
the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom as follows:
There are obviously situations where
the continental shelf off the coasts
of the United States is shared by an
adjacent state, and in such case it
will be necessary to work out the
boundary between the resources apper-
taining to the United States and to
its neighbors, when the utilization of
such resources become imminent. In
certain locations the continental shelf
extends from the United States territory
to the territory of a foreign country on
the other side of a portion of the high
seas. In such cases, likewise, the
determinations as to which resources
will fall to each country will become
necessary. The appropriate division
would appear to be a propoer matter
for settlement between the countries
immediately interested upon a fair
and equitable bases, as the untiliza-
tion of undersea resources progresses.
In as much as it would appear that for
some time to come installations will
be comparatively near shore and that
there will be little practical necessity
7
for delimitation, it would seem that this
may be left until some future time
when a wise and fair solution may be
found in the light of actual needs. 1 3
As envisioned in 1945, the practical requirements for
maritime boundaries were so few that by 1976 only four
maritime boundaries of the United States had been
established. 1 4 However, during the mid- 1970's powerful
economic forces were at work trying to push hydrocarbon
development into deeper waters. These economic forces were
joined by strong political forces whose goals were to
unilaterally extend their jurisdiction over resources and
activities in the water column and seabed and subsoil. The
trend toward claims to broader territorial seas and new
claims to fisheries jurisdiction or an economic zone was
bound to produce a greater number of maritime boundary
disputes.
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HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE
There were no questions concerning jurisdiction over the
Gulf of Maine Basin and Georges Bank until the 1960's. In
1964 Canada opened the dispute by unilaterally licensing
hydrocarbon exploration on Georges Bank. These permits were
granted in connection with a program aimed at developing
Canada's continental shelf. The location of these permits
were published in April of 1965, and in May of that year the
United States charged that Canada had leased areas located on
the continental shelf of the U.S.
Diplomatic consultations between the United States and
Canada took place during 1969. Both governments stated the
need for a continental shelf boundary delimitation, but there
was no progress. In view of this lack of progress the United
States proposed a moratorium on mineral exploration and
exploitation on Georges Bank until an agreement was
reached. 1 5 The moratorium was proposed in November of 1969
and rejected by the Canadian government in December of 1969.
The United States answered this rejection in the 21 February
Federal Register (1970) by publicly protesting against
Canadian leasing activities on Georges Bank. 1 6
Formal negotiations between the United States and Canada
concerning the continental shelf boundary began in Ottawa in
July of 1970. Canada took the position that no special
circumstances existed and the boundary should be constructed
by an equidistant line (Map 1). The United States, on the
9
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other hand, asserted that special circumstances did exist and
use of an equidistant line would produce an inequitable
boundary. The United States believed that the continental
shelf boundary should follow the Northeast Channel (Map 1).
Although a formal agreement was not reached both countries
suspended drilling activities in the Gulf of Maine and on the
northeastern part of Georges Bank so that these activities
would not interfere with the resolution of the dispute.
In 1976, both countries announced their intention to
establish 200-nautical mile fishing zones. On 13 April 1976,
the United States enacted the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976. The Act was to become effective 1
March 1977 and established a 200 nautical-mile fishery
conservation zone off the coast of the United States. The
Canadian government took similar action on 1 November 1976.
An Order in Council was published in The Canada Gazette
setting forth the limits of its 200 nautical mile fishing
zone effective 1 January 1977. On 4 November 1976, the
United States government responded with a Federal Register
notice setting the limits of its 200 nautical-mile fishery
conservation zone and its continental shelf in areas
bordering Canada.
On 24 February 1977, the United States and Canada signed
the 1977 Interim Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement. The
agreement prOVided for the continuation of existing fisheries
off the east and west coasts of each country, both within and
beyond the boundary regions, at existing levels and under
10
terms and conditions applicable to the fishermen of the
coastal states. The agreement would expire on 31 December
1977.
On 10 June 1977 the Canadian Department of External
Affairs issued a formal statement pertaining to the maritime
boundary in the Gulf of Maine stating that:
... as both Canada and the U.S.A. are parties
to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf, they are bound to settle that
continental shelf boundaries in accordance
with the Conventional Regime and, in
particular, with the equidistance-special
circumstances rule set out in Article 6.
Since [Canada] does not believe that any
"special circumstances" exist in the Gulf
of Maine/Georges Bank area, it holds that
the boundary should be determined by the
1 ' t' f th ' d i t " 1 1 7app lca lon 0 e equl lS ance prlnclp e.
One year later, in June of 1978, the Canadians halted
the fishing agreement renewal procedures by withdrawing from
the negotiations. As a result, neither country's fishermen
could enter the other's zone, and competitive overfishing
continued in the disputed zones as each side applied its own'
management policy. While the potential for disagreeable
incidents was growing, Canada further challenged the United
States on 15 Setpember 1978, by publishing a revised claim to
an additional 15 percent of Georges Bank. The revised
11
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Canadian claim (Map 1), which was largely based on an
assessment of the 1977 award in the Anglo-French Continental
Shelf arbitration, was arrived at by drawing an equidistance
line that discounted the effects of Cape Cod and Nantucket.
The United States immediately protested the claim, and
threatened to arrest any Canadian vessel attempting to fish
in the expanded area.
The U.S. and Canadian claims overlapped in the GUlf of
Maine/Georges Bank region, creating a disputed boundary area
of approximately 12,000 square nautical miles. To avoid a
serious confrontation on the boundary issue, both governments
agreed to submit the dispute to binding third party
settlement. On 29 March 1979, the governments of Canada and
the United States concluded two separate, but interrelated
agreements: the Fisheries Agreement and the Boundary
Settlement Treaty.
The Fisheries Agreement set forth rules for the sharing,
mutual access, and cooperative management with respect to 28
fish stocks. It established three categories for management:
joint management for transboundary stocks, primary management
for stocks of overriding interest, and independent management
for stocks in the undisputed zones. The Agreement also
provided for the establishment of a joint fisheries
commission that would oversee the agreement and settle
disputes. The agreement would be permanent, with the
entitlement to stocks being reviewed every 10 years.
Although the Fisheries Agreement won approval in Canada,
12
it became quite controversial in the United States -
especially within the New England fishing communities. The
U.S. Congress came to the conclusion that the Boundary
Settlement Treaty was acceptable because it provided a useful
mechanism for settling the boundary dispute, but the
Fisheries Agreement should not be ratified. The major
objection was that the entitlements to certain fish stocks
was unfair. For example, the United States scallop industry
argued that the 26.65% of the scallops catch that the
Agreement allocated to American fishermen would severely
restrict the growth of their industry.19
On 6 March 1981, President Ronald Reagan withdrew the
Fisheries Agreement from considertion by the Senate, stating
that the Agreement could not be ratified "in a form
20
acceptable to Canada." He recommended that the two
treaties be uncoupled and that the Boundary Settlement Treaty
be ratified.
April 1981.
This resolution was adopted by the Senate on 29
Although unhappy with the steps taken by the United
States, the Canadian government agreed to uncouple the two
treaties. The Treaty between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of Canada to Submit to
Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine ~rea was put into force upon
the exchange of instruments of ratification in Ottawa on 20
November 1981. On 25 November 1981, the Ambassador of United
States of America to the Netherlands and the Ambassador of
13
Canada to the Netherlands transmitted to the Registrar of the
International Court of Justice a certified copy of the
Special Agreement, and certified copies of the Treaty and
Protocol of Exchange recording the exchange of instruments of
. f' . 21ratl. l.catl.on.
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THE BOUNDARY SETTLEMENT TREATY
The Boundary Settlement Treaty was composed of four
articles. It also contained two Annexes that provided the
procedures of the binding third party settlement. The
Special Agreement, which was the Annex that was eventually
employed, provided that the parties submit the dispute to a
Chamber of the International Court of Justice. The other
Annex, known as the Arbitration Agreement, called for an ad
hoc court of arbitration to settle the dispute if a Chamber
could not be formed in 6 months. The Arbitration Agreement
was included as a back-up mechanism to ensure the ultimate
settlement of the dispute by a third party decision.
Article II, paragraph 1 of the Special Agreement set
forth the precise question the governments had agreed to
submit for binding decision:
1. The Chamber is requested to decide, in
accordance with the principles and rules
of international law applicable in the
matter as between the Parties, the following
question:
Wh at is the course of the single maritime
boundary that divides the continental shelf
and fisheries zones of Canada and the
United States of America from a point in latitude
15
44°11'12"N, longitude 67°16'46"W to a point
to be determined by the Chamber within an
area bounded by straight lines connecting
the following sets of geographic coordinates:
latitude 40 oN, longitude 67°W;
latitude 40 oN, longitude 6SoW;
latitude 42°N, longitude 6S0W?22
The starting point (44°11'12"N, 67~16'46"W) was selected
in order to avoid the unresolved problem concerning which of
the two contries has sovereignty over Machias Seal Island and
North Rock. If the United States owned the island, the
equidistant line boundary would pass to the east, separating
Machias Seal Island from Canada's Grand Manan Island. But if
the Machias Seal Island belonged to Canada, the maritime
border would pass between the Island and the coast of Maine.
The starting point, which was the first point of the
intersection south of the international boundary terminus of
the fishery limits claimed respectively by the United States
and Canada upon the extension of fisheries jurisdiction to
200 nautical miles, was chosen to ensure that the issue of
sovereignty over those islands was not before the ICJ.
The triangle described in Article II by connecting
straight lines to specific sets of coordinates also requires
explanation. The triangle was established to avoid the
possibility of the Court's decision prejudging the
determination of the outer edge of the continental margin or
other questions arising in determining the outer limit of the
16
200 nautical mile zone. No point in the triangle is more
significant than any other. Therefore, the Court may
terminate the delimitation line anywhere inside the
t r i 1 23rlang e.
Finally, Article III of the Special Agreement stated
that the United States and Canada have agreed that the single
maritime boundary decided by the Court shall serve for all
purposes relating to the claim on exercise of jurisdiction:
South and west of the maritime boundary
to be determined by the Chamber in
accordance with this Special Agreement
Canada shall not, and north and east of
said maritime boundary the United
States of American shall not, claim
or exercise sovereign rights or
jurisdiction for any purpose over
the waters or seabed and subsoil. 2 4
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CANADIAN POSITION
Canada based its position on the traditional
equidistance line. Canada asserted that both Canada and the
United States were parties to the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the Continental Shelf and that they did "not accept the
regime of customary international law, as defined and applied
by the ICJ between states not bound by the Convention on the
Continental Shelf, is applicable to the determination of the
continental shelf boundary between Canada and the
U.S.A.,,25 Therefore, since the 1958 Convention was in effect
and the North Sea cases was not applicable, both parties were
"bound to settle their continental shelf boundary in
accordance with the conventional regime and, in particular,
with the equidistance-special circumstances rule set out in
Article 6.,,26
Canada insisted that there were no special circumstances
in the area. They would not accept any of the factors raised
by the United States (i.e. proportionality and natural
prolongation) on the basis of suggestions made in the North
Sea decision, because although they were relevant in the
North Sea, they were not relevant in the Gulf of Maine.
Canada believed that the equidistance rule would produce an
equitable result because the protrusion of the peninsula of
Nova Scotia and the concavity of the U.S. coast in the Gulf
would be "amply compensated by the peninsula and islands
18
protruding seaward of Massachusetts in the area of Cape
cod.,,27
However, relying on the treatment of islands and
promontories in the Anglo-French Continental Shelf decision
Canada reviewed and updated their equidistance line (Map 2).
Their new, so-called "equitable equidistance" 28 line
expanded Canada's claim over an additional area of 2,800
square miles, including 1,500 square miles of Georges Bank.
The "equitable equidistance line" was drawn by discounting
the effect of Cape Cod and Nantucket on the grounds that such
a distorting effect would constitute "special circumstances"
under international law. 29
The Canadians also relied on t.wo other "special
circumstances." The first was acquiescence. The Canadian
government began issuing oil and gas exploration permits on
Georges Bank in 1964. Canada informed the United States in
1965 of its intentions to sell permits up to the equidistance
line and had received written acknowledgement of this
notification from Washington. Not until 1969, in a
diplomatic note, did the United States dispute Canada's
claim; stronger objection was made by the State Department in
1970. Canada maintained that this five year absence of
objection constituted American acquiescence and added weight
to their claim.
The second, and last "special circumstance" dealt with
economics. The Canadian government conducted a thorough
study comparing the impacts that the loss of fishing grounds
19
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MAP 2
would have on New England and Nova Scotia. The study
revealed that the economy of Nova Scotia would be hurt more
by the loss of certain fishing grounds, especially scallop
areas. Therefore, the Canadian government concluded that
fishing is more important to Canada than to the U.S., and
this should be a factor in their favor.
20
UNITED STATES POSITION
The United States believed that the basic principle in
delimiting a single maritime boundary was that the
delimitation should be in accordance with equitable
principles, taking account of all the relevant circumstances
in the area, to produce an equitable SOlution. 3 0
The U.S. felt that the delimitation line proposed in 1976,
based solely on fisheries management and conservation was
outdated. The 1982 Memorial proposed a new line (Map 2)
based on the following equitable principles:
1) The relationship between the relevant coasts of
the parties and maritime areas lying in front of those
coasts, including:
a) natural prolongation
b) nonencroachment
c) proportionality
2) Effective conservation and management of the natural
resources of the area
3) Conflict avoidance
4) Relevant circumstances of the area
The United States argued that the boundaries proposed by
Canada, which were largely based on the principle of
equidistance were unfair. The concavity of the New England
coastline and the convexity of the Nova Scotian coastline
would cause an equidistance line to be distorted towards the
21
United States' coastline. This distortion would establish a
boundary that was not in accordance with equitable
principles. The United States insisted that the only way to
arrive at a proper decision was to draw an "adjusted
perpendicular" line. The "adjusted" line (Map 2) would be
consistent with the principles governing delimitation and
yield an equitable solution. More specifically, the line
originated from the agreed point and traveled perpendicular
to the coast of Maine, with two modifications that ensured
Canada the jurisdiction over German Bank and Browns Bank.
According to the U.S., the "adjusted perpendicular" line
reflected the relationship between the relevant coasts of the
parties and the maritime areas lying in the front of those
coasts. Specifically, the principles of natural prolongation
and proportionality were applied. The United States
maintained that the Northeast Channel was the dividing line
between the two countries' shelves. The claim was based on
the fact that the Channel was more than 200 meters deep and
natural prolongation refers to the physical extension of the
land. Therefore, since the entire Georges Bank area was the
natural prolongation of the U.S., it should also be U.S.
terri tory.
Furthermore, the United States government believed that -
the 4 to 1 ratio of the lengths of the U.S coastline to the
Canadian coastline in the Gulf of Maine favored the United
States and that this principle of proportionality should be
reflected in the delimitation. The test of proportionality
22
had been articulated in both the North Sea cases and the
Anglo-French Arbitration. The United States relied on the
Anglo-French Arbitration by stating that "proportionality is
the criterion by which it may be determined whether
individual geographic features so distort the course of a
boundary as to result in a delimitation that is not in
consonance with the cardinal principle that a boundary be
delimited in accordance with equitable principles." 31 The
proposed Canadian line was unacceptable because it would
encroach upon areas lying in front of the United States'
coast, and allocate to Canada an area disproportionate to its
short secondary coastline.
The United States further supported its "adjusted"
boundary proposal by claiming that it would facilitate the
conservation and management of the natural resources of the
Gulf of Maine area. The Canadian equidistant line would
divide the resources of Georges Bank, whereas the U.S. line
would respect the ecological regimes of Georges Bank. The
U.S. felt that it would be difficult to conserve and manage
stocks that were divided between countries. Also, in
addition to dividing the commercially important stocks, the
Canadian line would divide and impede the development of
mineral resources in the Bank. The U.S. line would give
Canada German Bank and Brown's Bank, while reserving Georges
Bank for themselves.
The United States continued by saying that the
"adjusted" boundary would minimize disputes.
23
Since the
important stocks would be divided, there would be no need for
complex allocation and conservation agreements. In addition,
due to the fact that the adjusted line followed the Northeast
Channel, it could be easily identified by fishermen. In
contrast, the Canadian line would be difficult to identify
and cross an area of intense fishing activity, increasing the
potential for disputes.
Lastly, the United States maintained that they had
established the predominant interest in the Georges Bank area
through continuous activities for more that 200 years. The
government held that U.S. fishermen had fished longer and to
a larger extent in the area. The U.S. went even further by
claiming that U.S. fishermen alone developed the fisheries of
Georges Bank. It was also mentioned that the United States
had provided aids to navigation (including detailed surveying
and charting), conducted search and rescue operations in the
area, provided for its defense, conducted scientific
research, and proposed and led international efforts to
protect the fisheries. Finally, the U.S. stated that Cape
Cod and Nantucket were central figures in all this activity
and had always had close ties to Georges Bank. Therefore,
Canada was wrong in trying to discount Cape Cod and Nantucket
b I , h "d i , i e c t i ,,32Y cal lng t em lstortlng proJec lons.
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INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
International conventions are a major source of
international law. However, the convention must be in the
form of a 34"law-making treaty." A law- making treaty is
concluded among a number of countries acting in their own
interest, intending to make a new rule through formal action
in accordance with the provisions of the treaty or by
acquiescence in and observance of the new
rUle. 3 5 The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf and the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea are
international conventions that deal with continental shelf
delimitation.
25
1958 CONVENTION
The 1958 Geneva Convention of the Continental Shelf
contains procedures to be followed in the case of a
continental shelf dispute. Article 6 of the Convention
states:
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent
to the territories of two or more states whose
coasts are opposite each other the boundary of
the continental shelf appertaining to such States
shall be determined by agreement between them.
In the absence of agreement, and unless another
boundary line is justified by special circum-
stances, the boundary is the median line, every
point of which is equidistant from the nearest
points of the baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial sea of each state is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent
to the territories of two adjacent states, the
boundary of the continental shelf shall be deter-
mined by agreement between them. In the absence
of an agreement, and unless another boundary line
is justified by special circumstances, the boundary
shall be determined by application of the principle
of equidistance from the nearest points of the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea of each state is measured. 3 6
26
An analysis of Article 6 reveals that the preferred
method of dispute settlement is an international agreement.
If an agreement cannot be reached, the principle of
equidistance (or medium line) should be employed. However,
in cases that involve special circumstances, the equidistance
line should be modified to account for these circumstances.
The contents of Article 6 have been criticized due to
the unclear relationship between equidistance and special
circumstances. Article 6 does not provide a definitive rule.
A major problem can be seen in situations where the parties
disagree on the existence and/or assessment of special cir-
cumstances. Also, the recent extension of maritime bounda-
ries have raised additional doubts about Article 6 because
the farther out the equidistance line is extended, the
greater the magnifying effect of diversion becomes. 37
An additional problem exists within the Convention.
Article 6 seems to treat opposite and adjacent as two
mutually exclusive situations. Unfortunately this is not
true, especially in the Gulf of Maine dispute. Canada and
the United States are both opposite and adjacent nations.
Canada and the United States are adjacent to each other in
the northern areas of the GUlf, and opposite each other in
the southern regions. However, this should not be a problem.
The real issue of the boundary dispute lies in the
differences between a maritime boundary delimited by the
equidistance (and/or median) principle or one delimited on
b 'f " 38the aS1S 0 speclal Clrcumstances.
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LAW OF THE SEA (UNCLOS III)
The Draft Convention of the United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea (1982) introduces a new principle to be
used in maritime boundary delimitations - equity. Although
the Convention has not yet become international law, nor has
the United States agreed to it, it is indicative of a view
that the International Court of Justice might have
entertained during the U.S.-Canadian maritime boundary
delimitation. Article 83 of the Draft Convention reads:
The delimitation of the continental shelf
between states with opposite or adjacent
coasts shall be effected by agreement on
the basis of international law, as referred
to in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, in order to
achieve equitable solution. 39an
Article 38 of the above mentioned Statute requires the
ICJ to apply (1) international conventions, (2) international
custom, (3) the general principles of law as recognized by
civilized nations, and (4) judicial decisions and the
teachings of highly qualified writers when determining the
appropriate rules of law. 4 0 Therefore, as long as these
gUidelines are followed, and the decision is just, the
general nature of the Draft Convention seems to allow the use
of any reasonable method boundary delimitation.
28
Furthermore,
whether UNCLOS III is acceptable or not, it would appear that
the notion of equity is likely to play an important role in
the determination of continental shelf boundaries.
29
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Decisions of courts and tribunals, when applying
international law, form an indirect and subsidiary source of
international law. However, the decisions of international
tribunals have begun to play an increasingly important part
in determining the existence and meanings of rules of law.
Prior to 198 4, the r e were two important continental shelf
boundary delimita n disputes that were handled by
international tribunals, the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases and 1977 United Kingdom-France Continental Shelf
Arbitration. The applicable rules of law developed in these
cases were reviewed by the International Court of Justice
prior to and during the Gulf of Maine proceedings.
30
NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF
The North Sea, whose geographical location and
boundaries are described in the North Sea Policing of
Fisheries Convention of 6 May 1882, has, in the words of the
ICJ "to some extent the general look of an enclosed sea
without actually being one. Round its shores are situated,
on the eastern side and starting from the north, Norway,
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands,
Belgium and France; while the whole western side is taken up
by Great Britain, together with the island groups of the
41Orkneys and Shetlands."
The entire seabed of the North Sea, with the exception
of the Norwegian Trough, is continental shelf--nowhere does
the depth exceed 200 meters. The opposite nations of the
North Sea (Map 3), the United Kingdom on the western side,
and Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands on the eastern side,
had fixed their respective continental shelf boundaries by
employing the "median line" principle from the 1958
Continental Shelf Convention. In addition, the Federal
Republic of Germany, by agreements in 1964 and 1965 with
Denmark and the Netherlands, established certain partial
boundaries. Unfortunately, the Federal Republic could not
reach agreement with Denmark and the Netherlands on the other
boundaries that extended farther out into the North Sea.
Denmark and the Netherlands felt that the boundary should be
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decided in accordance with the equidistance principle set
forth in Article 6 of the 1958 Convention. The Federal
Republic disagreed.
The Federal Republic of Germany pointed out the fact
that they did not ratify the 1958 Convention and were not a
party to it. Therefore, the equidistance principle of
Article 6 could not be applied against the Federal Republic .
They also complained that application of the equidistance
principle would yield an inequitable boundary because it
would pUll the boundary line inward, in the direction of the
concave coastline of the Federal Republic. By contrast, the
outwardly curving coasts of Denmark and the Netherlands would
force the boundary lines drawn on an equidistance basis to
leave the coast on divergent courses, thus having a widening
effect on their continental shelf areas.
By agreement, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark,
and the Netherlands agreed to submit their dispute to the
International Court of Justice. On 20 February 1967 the
Court was requested to answer the following question:
What principles and rules of international
law are applicable to the delimitation as
between the parties of the areas of the
continental shelf in the North Sea which
appertain to each of them beyond the
partial boundary determined by the above-
mentioned convention of 9 June 1965?42
(The Convention of June 1965 refers to the partial
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boundary agreements already discussed.)
In this particular continental shelf delimitation the
Court was asked to decide which principles of international
law should be employed. The Court was not asked to actually
delimit the boundaries. The actual delimitation would be
performed by the parties involved "by agreement in pursuance
of the decision requested from the. . Court. "43 In other
words, the decision would be based on the principles and
rules of international law found by the Court to be
applicable.
The Court agreed that the Federal Republic was not
subject to the provisions of the 1958 Convention. More
importantly, the Court ruled that delimitation of continental
shelf boundaries between adjacent and opposite states:
.is to be effected by agreement in
accordance with equitable principles, and
taking into account all of the relevant
circumstances, in such a way as to leave
as much as possible to each Party all those
parts of the continental shelf that
constitute a natural prolongation of its
land territory into and under the sea,
without encroachment on the natural
prolongation of the land territory of
the other. 4 4
Why should continental shelf delimitations be based on
equitable principles? The Court stated that "whatever the
33
legal reasoning of a court of justice, its decisions "must by
definition be just, and therefore in that sense
equitable. ,,45 The Court felt that although the equidistance
principle was still a valid principle of law, it was not a
principle that would allow for an equitable decision.
Specifically, the Court noted that in the North Sea case with
its convex and concave coastlines, equidistance would magnify
the distortion to the detriment of the Federal Republic of
Germany. Therefore, another alternative method must be
developed. The Court decided that the alternative method
would be to employ whatever principles are necessary to
arrive at an equitable (just) decision.
In his article on continental shelf, delimitation M. D.
Belcher said that "abstract equitable principles" can be
modified by concrete "relevant circumstances." Both must be
considered before an equitable delimitation can be
made.,,46 He continued by saying that the "relevant
circumstances" are the data and "equitable principles" are
the nature of the rules which in their application must give
weight to the various "relevant circumstances." The Court
highlighted the importance of "relevant circumstances" by
stating that when choosing them there is "no legal limit to
the considerations which States may take account of for the
purpose of making sure that they apply equitable
procedures. "47 The Court went on by specifically mentioning
the relevant circumstances that existed in the North Seas
case:
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(1) the general configuration of the coasts
of the Parties, as well as the presence
of any special or unusual features;
(2) so far as known or readily ascertainable,
the physical and geological structure,
and natural resources, of the continental
shelf areas involved;
(3) the element of a reasonable degree of
proportionality, which a delimitation
carried out in accordance with equitable
principles ought to bring about between
the extent of the continental shelf areas
appertaining to the coastal State and the
length of its coast measured in the
general direction of the coastline,
account being taken for this purpose
of the effects, actual or prospective,
of any other continental shelf delimitations
between adjacent states in the same region. 48
In summary, the Court held that no single method of
delimitation is mandatory in all situations. However, the
Court did require that all delimitation decisions be in
accordance with equitable principles, taking into account all
relevant circumstances. The applicable principles identified
by the Court were the principles of natural prolongation and
non-encroachment. Among the factors identified as relevant
to delimitation were: the general configuration of the
coastlines, including the presence of unusual features; the
physical and geographical structure of the continental shelf;
the natural resources of the continental shelf,
proportionality, and any other relevant circumstance that
would lead to an equitable solution.
The gUiding rule, laid down in the North Sea Continental
Shelf cases, is that in the absence of agreement between
parties a continental shelf boundary is to be determined in
accordance with equitable principles. Those principles,
theoretically discovered by a court, should enable it to find
the boundary. Used in this sense "equitable" is really no
more than a synonym for fair, just, reasonable, or
appropriate.
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UNITED KINGDOM - FRANCE CONTINENTAL SHELF ARBITRATION
The United Kingdom and France lie across from each other
and are separated by the English Channel (Map 4). This
proximity caused a dispute over the position of their
continental shelf boundary. The two countries attempted to
negotiate a settlement on their own between 1970 and 1974.
These negotiations resulted in some agreement; specifically,
east of 30 minutes longitude west of Greenwich, the two sides
agreed in principle that the boundary should be based on a
principle of equidistance. However, the two sides continued
to disagree on the portion of the continental shelf boundary
west of 30 minutes longitude west of Greenwich.
There were two major areas of difference. The first
involved the Channel Islands (Map 4). The United Kingdom
argued that the boundary should be drawn equidistant between
the French coast and the Channel Islands, thereby leaving to
France only a narrow strip of maritime jurisdiction between
the French coast and the Channel Islands, and giving to the
United Kingdom virtually all of the continental shelf of the
English Channel located in this area. The French countered
by saying that the Channel Islands should be entitled to no
more than six mile belt of jurisdiction and that the boundary
should follow an equidistant line between the French coast
and the mainland of the United Kingdom.
The other major area of difference was in the Western
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Approaches to the English Channel. The French believed that
a boundary should follow the bisector of an angle formed by
two lines expressing the general direction of the coasts of
the United Kingdom and France. On the other hand, the United
Kingdom felt that the boundary should be determined by the
application of the principle of equidistance, utilizing the
Scillies and Ushant Islands as basepoints for measuring the
equidistant line.
On JUly 10, 1975, after finding it impossible to resolve
their differences, the United Kingdom and France entered into
an Arbitration Agreement. Article 2 of the Arbitration
Agreement provides
"The Court is requested to decide, in
accordance with the rules of international
law applicable in the matter as between
the parties, the following question ...
What is the course of the boundary
(or boundaries) between the portions
of the continental shelf appertaining
to the United Kingdom and the Channel Islands
and to the French Republic, respectfully
westward of 30 minutes west of the
Greenwich Meridian as far as the
1,000 metre isobath?,,49
In this case the Court of Arbitration was not only asked
to declare the legal principles relative to the delimita-
tion -- they were also asked to actually decide the actual
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course of the continental shelf boundary in the arbitration
area and to draw the course on a chart.
The Court first addressed the rules and principles of
international law in force between the parties. France
argued that the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf
was not in force between the parties because of certain
reservations it made when signing the treaty. The purpose of
this was to get the International Court of Justice to employ
equitable principles as set forth in their North Seas cases.
On the other hand, the United Kingdom took the view that the
Shelf Convention was in force between the two parties and
that the principles of law set forth in Article 6 were
relevant to the delimitation.
After hearing arguments on both sides the Court decided
to apply two different legal regimes along the course of the
boundary. The Court held that the Shelf Convention was a
treaty in force between the United Kingdom and France.
However, the finding that the Shelf Convention was in force
did not disperse of the question of the effect of the French
reservations to the Convention. The Court found that
reservations were valid and should be employed in the
appropriate areas (the English Channel). Therefore, the
Court would apply customary law in the Channel Islands area
and Article 6 of the Shelf Convention in the Atlantic area.
In justifying their decision the Court stated that "in the
circumstances of the present case, the rules of customary law
lead to much the same result as the provisions of Article
39
6. ,,50
The Court's holding that Article 6 and equitable
principles were related was important. It had been the view
that Article 6 accents the role of equidistance, while
customary law as set forth in the North Sea case tended to
minimize the role of equidistance as a legal criterion for
the delimitation of continental shelf boundaries. Now, in
the first relevant international judicial decision since the
North Sea case, the Court took the view that the principle of
those cases and the rule of the Convention were virtually the
same.
In its analysis the Court found that Article 6 did not
establish two rules (equidistance rule and a special
circumstance rule), but instead provided for a combined
equidistance-special circumstance rule. The Court noted that
the role of special circumstances in Article 6 was to ensure
an equitable delimitation and that the combined equidistance-
special circumstances rule in effect provided for the general
norm of customary law, that the continental shelf boundary to
be determined in accordance with equitable principles. The
Court held that
"the equidistance-special circumstance
rule and the rules of customary law have
the same object - the delimitation of the
boundary in accordance with equitable
principles. In the view of this court,
therefore, the rules of customary law
40
are relevant and even essential means
both for interpreting and completing
the terms of Article 6.,,51
Having found that both Article 6 and customary law lead
to the same result - that is, a boundary of equitable
character - the Court constructed a continental shelf
boundary applying the following applicable law:
"The appropriateness of the equidistance
method or any other method for the
purpose of effecting an equitable
delimitation is a function or reflection
of the geographical and other relevant
circumstances of each particular case.
The choice of this method or methods
of delimitation of any given case,
whether under the 1958 Convention or
customary law, has therefore to be
determined in the light of those
circumstances and of the fundamental
norm that the delimitation must be
. d . h . b . . I ,,52ln accor ance Wlt equlta Ie prlnclp es.
After considering the two preceding conventions and the
North Sea and Anglo-French cases it is difficult to determine
the applicable law that existed prior to the Gulf of Maine
case. A combination of the preceding elements would probably
lead to the conclusion that a present-day delimitation must
41
be in accordance with equitable principles, taking into
account the relevant circumstances, so as to yield an
equitable solution. These equitable principles include the
principle that delimitation should reflect the relationship
between the relevant coasts and adjacent seabed, including
proportionality and natural prolongation. All relevant
circumstances in the area should also be considered.
Geographical and geological circumstances, the existence and
location of resource deposits, and activities in the area
have been identified as relevant circumstances in past
delimitations. It seems that any method or combination of
methods that produce an equitable solution are acceptable.
42
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ)
The desirability of having in existence a true
international court to settle legal disputes between states
was reflected in the Covenant of the League of Nations.
Article 14 of the Covenant called for the establishment of a
Permanent Court of International Justice. As a result of
this directive, an Advisory Council of Jurists met at the
Hague in June 1920 to draft the basic statute of such a
court. The statute was approved on December 13, 1920 and was
to be binding on nations only if they signed and ratified a
Protocol of Signature. By December 1942, the protocol had
been ratified by fifty-one nations, including all major
powers except the United States.
After the end of World War II, the statute was revised.
This was due to the fact that the former Assembly of the
League of Nations dissolved the Permanent Court in January
1946. The new International Court of Justice (ICJ) was
immediately established as a successor. In most details, the
Statute of the new court was a repeat of the old one. The
major change that did accompany the revision was that all
member nations to the United Nations were automatically
parties to the Statute of the new court.
The International Court of Justice consists of fifteen
judges qualified to hold the highest judicial offices in
their own countries or recognized as experts in international
43
law. Judges, once elected by the General Assembly and
Security Council, serve a term of nine years. Five judges
are elected every three years. Judges may be reelected and
dismissed only when the other members are convinced that they
have ceased to fulfill the required conditions of holding
office. No two judges may be citizens of the same country.
And in the given case where a party to a dispute before the
court does not have a national sitting on the court, an
appropriate temporary (ad hoc) judge will be appointed .
Finally, nine judges constitute a quorum (excluding the
i ud ) 53temporary JU ge .
The ICJ has jurisdiction over any case that the parties
refer to it and in all other matters especially provided for
in the U.N. Charter or in treaties in force. However, the
submitted dispute must be capable of being settled by a court
and must have arisen between the parties in question.
The states that are parties to the Statute may at any
time declare that they recognize as compulsory in relation to
any other nation accepting the same obligation, the
jurisdiction of the court in all legal disputes concerning:
1 - the interpretations of a treaty
2 - any question of international law
3 - the existence of any fact that would constitute
a breach of an international obligation
4 - the nature or extent of the reparation to be
made for the breach of an international
bl . t · 54olga lon.
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When the court reaches a decision, the decision has no
binding force except between the parties and in respect of
the particular case in question. 5 5 A judgement of the court
is final and without appeal. An application for the revision
of a judgement can be made only when it is based on the
discovery of a fact of such a nature as to be a decisive
factor, which must have been unknown to the court and to the
party claiming revision at the time when the judgement was
given.
Finally, in reaching a decision the court must apply:
1 - international conventions
2 - international custom (as evidence by general
practice accepted as law)
3 - the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations
4 - judicial decisions and the teachings of publicists
(as subsidiary means for the determination of rules
56
of law).
The ICJ may also decide a case on the principles of
equity (ex aequo et bono) . This means that the Court can use
its own judgement, even if this means a disregard of existing
law, in order to arrive at a fair decision. Permission mus t
be granted by all parties in a dispute before equity
.. b d 57prlnclples can e use .
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THE DECISION
The International Court of Justice handed down their
decision on 12 October 1984. The Chamber consisted of four
permanent judges and one judge "ad hoc." The President of
the Chamber was Judge Ago of Italy. He was assisted by
Judges Gros of France, Mosler of West Germany, and Schwebel
of the United States. The judge "ad hoc" was Judge Cohen of
Canada. The Agent and Counsel for the United States was the
Honorable Davis R. Robinson, the Legal Advisor for the
Department of State. Canada was represented by the Honorable
Mark MacGuigan, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of
Canada, and Mr. L. H. Legault, Legal Advisor for the
Department of External Affairs.
The Court began by stating that the Special Agreement
gave the ICJ clear jurisdiction over the Gulf of Maine case.
They also stated that they did not have a problem with the
starting and ending points selected by the Parties in the
Special Agreement. Point A (44°11'12"N, 67°16'46"W) would be
the starting point because it was the first point of
intersection of the two lines representing the limits of the
fishing zones respectively claimed by Canada and the United
States when they decided upon the extension of their
fisheries jurisdiction up to 200 nautical miles. This point
would also allow the U.S. and Canada, rather than the ICJ,
to decide the sovereignty of Machias Seal Island and North
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Rock. The delimitation line would terminate in the triangle
previously mentioned in the Special Agreement so as to avoid
the possibility of the Court's decision prejudging such
questions as that of the determination of the outer edge of
the continental margin.
Paragraph 26 of the ICJ decision brought out an aspect
of the case that distinguished it from previous continental
shelf cases. For the first time the delimitation which the
Court was asked to effect did not relate exclusively to the
continental shelf, but to both the continental shelf and the
exclusive fishing zone. Moreover, the delimitation was to be
by a single boundary. The Court observed that the Parties
took it for granted that this could indeed be done. However,
the Court decided that since there was no international law
to the contrary a single line could be drawn.
The first major task of the Court was to determine the
applicable law concerning continental shelf delimitation, as
the Special Agreement stated "the principles and rules of
international law applicable in the matter as between the
parties.,,58 The Court's first step was to review existing
international conventions that dealt with maritime
delimitation. In the second step the Court looked at
previous cases that involved continental shelf delimitation.
The Court began by looking at the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf. This was an important convention
because both Parties had ratified it and acknowledged that it
was in force between them. The 1958 Convention's major
47
shortcoming, as identified by the Court, was that it
concerned the sea-bed and its subsoil, and not the water
column. However, the Court did find Article 6 of the
Convention relevant. The Court determined that the 1958
Convention "clearly affirms a principle"59 that any
delimitation must be effected by agreement between the States
concerned. Further interpretation revealed that "any
agreement or other equivalent solution should involve the
application of equitable criteria, namely criteria derived
from equity. "60 The Court concluded by stating their
interpretation - that delimitation must be effected by
agreement - was already "enshrined" in customary
international law, and was valid for all States and any type
of maritime delimitation.
The Court turned to the proceedings of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) to
support their interpretation of the 1958 Convention. Article
74 of the Conference was concerned with exclusive economic
zones and Article 83 was concerned with the continental
shelf. Both Articles directly supported the 1958 Convention
by stating that the delimitation of exclusive economic zones
and continental shelves should "be effected by agreement on
the basis of international law."61 Furthermore, the Court
declared that the rules derived from this Conference would
not be invalidated by the fact that the Conference was not
yet in force or ratified by the Parties involved.
Additionally, the Court stated that the Parties could not
48
object to this because the economic zones claimed by both the
u.s. and Canada were based on Part V of the Conference.
After reviewing the existing international conventions,
the Court turned its attention to the North Sea Continental
Shelf and Anglo-French Continental Shelf cases. The Court
credited the North Sea decision as the "greatest contribution
62to the formation of customary law" in the area of
continental shelf delimitation. The ICJ insisted that the
1967 judgement restated and endorsed the dual principle that
delimitation must be obtained by agreement between the
Parties, and that such an agreement must be based on
equitable principles. The Court also induced that the States
involved have an obligation to enter into negotiations with
the view of arriving at an agreement and to "act in such a
way that, in the particular case, and taking all the
circumstances into accounts, equitable principles are
applied"63 , no matter what methods are used. In addition,
the Court found that the Court of Arbitrations decision
(1977) on the continental shelf between France and the United
Kingdom confirmed their interpretation and enunciated the
general rule of customary international law on the matter:
"failing agreement, the boundary between States abutting on
the same continental shelf is to be determined o n equitable
. . 1 "64prlnclp es.
In paragraph 112, the Court concluded their review of
the rules of international law on the question to which the
dispute between the U.S. and Canada related by presenting a
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"more complete" and "more precise" formulation of what they
saw as the general international law that should apply in all
continental shelf disputes. They defined it as follows:
(1) No maritime delimitation between states
with opposite or adjacent coasts may be
effected unilaterally by one of those
States. Such delimitation must be sought
and effected by means of an agreement,
following negotiations conducted in good
faith and with the genuine intention of
achieving a positive result. Where,
however, such agreement cannot be achieved,
delimitation should be effected by recourse
to a third party possessing the necessary
competence.
(2) In either case, the delimitation is to be
effected by the application of equitable criteria
and by the use of practical methods capable of
ensuring, with regard to the geographic
configuration of the area and other relevant
circumstances, an equitable result. 65
Once the Court was confident that they had established
the "fundamental norm" of customary international law
governing maritime delimitation, they were ready to address
the claims made by Canada and the United States.
Canada had claimed that the equidistance method was
mandatory due to the 1958 Convention and had proposed two
50
delimitation lines, one called a "strict equidistance line
and the other a corrected equidistance line."66
The Court decided that both of these lines were
unacceptable. One reason given was that the equidistance
method was not mandatory in cases that involved the
delimitation of a fishery zone. The ICJ was asked to decide
a single delimitation line for both the continental shelf and
the superjacent fishery zone. Therefore, even though both
countries were Parties to the 1958 Convention, the Court
could not justify extending the continental shelf provisions
of the Convention into a general rule applicable to every
maritime delimitation.
The Court found another reason why Canada's use of the
equidistance method was unacceptable. Canada did not account
for the change in the geographical situation that took place
as one moved south and approached the outer opening of the
Gulf. What was once an adjacent situation had become a
situation involving opposite states. The Court showed that
when lines were drawn between the elbow of Cape Cod and Cape
Ann (on the United States side) and between Cape Sable and
Brier Island (on the Canadian side) the resulting situation
was that of two parallel lines (Map 5). The 1958 Convention
would require the use of a median line in this situation,
however the Canadian equidistance line neglected to account
for this.
The Court also decided not to honor the "special
circumstances" claimed by the Canadian government.
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Specifically, the Court did not feel that the United States
had acquiesced in Canada's delimitation of the Georges Bank
continental shelf. First, the correspondence that took place
between the U.S. and Canada from 1964 to 1969 pertained to
technical matters and were conducted by civil servants, not
members of the Department of State (U.S.) and the Department
of External Affairs (Canada). Canada could not rely on the
contents of a letter from an official of the Bureau of Land
Management of the Department of the Interior as though it
were an official declaration of the United States Government
on that country's international maritime boundaries.
Furthermore, the Court declared that a lapse of 5 years was
considered brief and did not constutute acquiescence in this
situation.
The ICJ was equally successful in disputing the proposed
boundaries and special circumstances put forth by the United
States government. The initial U.S. boundary proposal of
1976 was immediately rejected because it was based on only
one criterion - single-state management of fish stocks. The
Court found that this "criterion may have been justified for
a delimitation concerning exclusive fishing zones alone, but
less so for a 'single' delimitation, in whose purpose the
continental shelf and especially the resources of its subsoil
also playa most important part".67 Management of fish stoc k s
was only one characteristic of the case, whereas a
delimitation line must reflect all characteristics.
Turning their attention to the 1982 proposal, the Court
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admitted that the "adjusted perpendicular" line was clearly
an effort on the behalf of the United States to remedy the
omission of other important geographical aspects from their
earlier proposal. The new U.S. proposal was based on the
central idea of the general direction of the "primary"
coasts, plus the included criteria of proportionality, non-
encroachment, and natural prolongation. The U.S. also
retained the idea of total respect for the unity of
ecosystems or ecological regimes in the area. Nevertheless,
the Court rejected the "adjusted perpendicular" line.
The Court found the compromise solution between two
fundamentally different methods, the geometrical method of
the perpendicular to the general direction of the coast and
the ecological method, unacceptable. The Court used the
reasoning previously presented to reject the ecological
method. As for the perpendicular method, the Court found it
convenient, but not applicable to the Gulf of Maine
situation. The Court said that it was "hard to imagine a
case less conducive to the application of this method of
delimitation that the Gulf of Maine case.,,68
The Court argued the existence of "primary" and "secondary"
coasts, and insisted that the special circumstances of the
situation would entail so many adjustments that they would
"completely distort,,69 the purpose behind perpendicular
delimitation.
The Court supported their decision by rUling on the
"natural prolongation" issue. The Court declared that the
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"geological strata" underlying the whole of the continental
shelf of North America, including the Gulf of Maine, was
continuous. Scientific findings revealed that the shelf was
"a single continuous, uniform structure. "70 Even the
Northeast Channel did not possess the characteristics of a
real trough marking the dividing line between two distinct
units. Furthermore, the Court stated that they did not think
it was possible for any sure and stable, natural boundaries
to exist in "so fluctuating an environment as the waters of
71the ocean." These findings defeated the special
circumstances of natural prolongation and conservation of
fish stocks proposed by the United States.
Proportionality was also addressed. The Court did not
believe the length of the respective coasts of the Parties
concerned did in itself constitute either a criterion serving
as a direct basis for a delimitation, or a method that could
be used to implement such delimitation. However, the Court
did recognize that the concept of proportionality should be
employed when checking a delimitation based on other
criteria. In the Court's words: "a maritime delimitation
can certainly not be established by a direct division of the
area in dispute proportional to the respective lengths of the
coasts belonging to the parties in the relevant area, but it
is equally certain that a substantial disproportion to the
lengths of those coasts that resulted from a delimitation
effected on a different basis would constitute a circumstance
calling for an appropriate correction. ,,72
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Lastly, the Court attacked two special circumstances
that were claimed by both countries. Both Canada and the
United States were charged with trying to refashion
geography. The Court would not accept the u.s. claim that
the concave shape of the New England coast and outward
projection of Nova Scotia would create an unfair
delimitation. They also ruled that Canada could not
disregard the existence of so substantial a peninsula as Cape
Cod. The Court declared that "the facts of geography are not
the product of human action amenable to positive or negative
judgements, but the result of natural phenomena, so that they
can only be taken as they are.,,73
The Court next addressed the issue of economic
importance. Both countries presented statistics, tables, and
graphs that analyzed the respective importance of the
resources drawn from the Georges Bank area. Canada revealed
that the removal of Canadian fishermen from Georges Bank
would have a disastrous effect on the economy of Nova Scotia.
On the other hand, the United States emphasized the
deleterious effect on the conservation of the Bank's fish
stocks that would result if the stocks were divided between
countries. The Court charged that these studies over-
emphasized the prospects and also accused both countries of
removing foreign fishing vessels from their exclusive fishery
zones without concern for the repercussions on the economies
of countries in question.
After reviewing the claims of both Canada and the United
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States, the International Court of Justice rendered their
decision. They began by declaring the claims and special
circumstances proposed by both Parties unacceptable to the
Gulf of Maine case. It would be the duty of the Court to
arrive at a decision independent of the proposals presented
by the Parties. In the final stage of the decision making
process, the Court obliged itself to determine the
delimitation line that it was required to draw "while basing
itself for the purpose of criteria which it finds most likely
to prove equitable in relation to the relevant circumstances
of the case and while making use, in order to apply these
criteria to the case of the practical method or combination
of methods which it deems the most appropriate; all this with
the final aim in view of reaching an equitable result in the
above circumstances. "74 With respect to the single
delimitation line for the continental shelf and the
superjacent water column, the Court added that the selected
criterion, when applied, should not give to preferential
treatment to one of the two objects.
The Court's decision began to take shape in Paragraph
207. The Court ruled that the delimitation line could not be
unidirectional. A straight line would neglect either the
coast of Massachusetts or that part of the Nova Scotian coast
which abutted upon the Gulf. In other words, a straight line
would ignore the changing geographical situation (from
adjacent to opposite states). Therefore, the delimitation
line would have to contain three segments.
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The first of the two segments originated in the
innermost sector of the Gulf. The ICJ was convinced that no
special circumstances existed in this area. Therefore, the
first segment of the delimitation line was based on "an equal
division of the area of overlapping created by the lateral
superimposition of the maritime projections of the Coasts of
the two States. "75
In practical terms, the Court drew two lines from Point
A (Map 6). One line was perpendicular to the line that
connected Cape Elizabeth and the international boundary
terminus, while the other was perpendicular to the line that
connected the terminus and Cape Sable. These perpendiculars
formed, at point A, on one side an acute angle of about 82
and on the other a reflex angle of about 278 . The Court
chose the bisector of the second angle as the course for the
first segment. Its finishing point would automatically be
determined by the intersection of the line carrying it with
the line that would contain the second segffient. The Court
felt that method of delimitation combined the advantages of
simplicity and clarity with that of producing a result that
was very close to being an equal division.
At this point the Court turned its attention toward the
second segment. The Court began by repeating its belief that
Canada and the United States become opposite States as one
moves away from the coast. Once again they pointed out that
the line connecting Cape Ann and the elbow of Cape Cod, and
the line connecting Briar Island and Cape Sable were
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parallel. The Court concluded that the only possible
solution was to draw a median line parallel to the
approximately parallel lines of the two opposite coasts.
However, under closer examination, the Court decided
that it would be prudent to look at one special circumstance
as an auxiliary criterion. The Court realized that they must
consider the fact that in relation to the median line, the
back of the Gulf was made up entirely by the continuous coast
of Maine. This was not a circumstance to be overlooked.
Therefore, the Court was bound to give consideration to the
concept of "proportionality" and apply some type of
correction to the median line.
In order to determine the proper correction the Court
measured the u.s. and Canadian coastlines along the Gulf.
The overall length of the U.S. coastline was 284 nautical
miles, as compared to 206 nautical miles for the Canadian
coastline. The ratio between the coastal fronts of the
United States and Canada on the Gulf of Maine was 1.38 to 1.
It was the view of the Court that this ratio should be
reflected in the location of the second segment of the
delimitation line. However, before the ratio was actually
applied it was changed to 1.32 to 1 because the Court decided
to give Seal Island, a small island located off the coat of
Nova Scotia, half effect.
The corrected median line was constructed between the
opposite and parallel coasts of Massachusetts and Canada. In
establishing this "median line" the Court placed a straight
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line from a point on Cape Cod (42 00'31"N, 70 01'36"W) and
Cheboyne Point, Nova Scotia (43 43'57"N, 66 07'18"W). Then
the Court found a point on the line that divided it in
accordance with the 1.32 to 1 ratio. A line, parallel to the
opposite coasts, was then drawn from this point. The second
segment of the delimitation began where this parallel line
crossed the first segment (Point B) and continued along this
parallel line until it reached the closing line of the Gulf
(Point C).
The Court completed the delimitation by extending the
line from point C (Map 6) in a direction perpendicular to the
closing line of the Gulf. The Court ended the delimitation
line inside the triangle (Point 0) where the perpendicular
line crossed the last point of intersection between the
countries 200-mile fishing zones. A geometrical method of
delimitation was used to construct the last segment because
it was located on the open ocean, free from any geographical
influences. Therefore, the delimitation line fixed by the
ICJ between the maritime jurisdictions of the United States
and Canada was the line that successively connected points A,
B, C, and o.
In summary, the delimitation line fixed by the
International Court of Justice between the maritime
jurisdictions of Canada and the United States was the line
that successively connected points A, B, C, and o. More
officially, the Court decided
"that the course of a single maritime
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boundary that divides the continental
shelf and the exclusive fisheries zones
of Canada and the United States of
America in the area referred to in the
Special Agreement concluded by those two
States on 29 March 1979 shall be defined
by geodetic lines connecting the points
with the following coordinates:
Latitude North Longitude West
A 44" 11 '12" 67°16'46"
B 42 0 53' 14" 67°14'35"
C 42° 31 ' 08" 67°28'15"
D 40"27'05" 65°41'59"
Done in French and in English, the French
text being authoritative, at the Peace
Palace, the Hague, this twelfth day
of October one thousand nine hundred
d . ht f ,,76an elg your ....
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IMMEDIATE REACTION
The International Court of Justice was satisfied with
their decision. They believed that all criteria had been
addressed, and there were no exceptional conditions that
would justify a correction to their delimitation line. The
ICJ was confident that the delimitation they effected was in
compliance with the governing principles and rules of law.
More specifically, equitable criteria and appropriate methods
had been applied and an equitable decision had been produced.
Unfortunately, the United States and Canada did not
share in the ICJ's jubilation. Although the decision is only
six months old, there is already talk of negotiating a treaty
that would restore joint fishing rights. The United States
received two-thirds of Georges Bank, but many involved with
the fishing industry have claimed that the new boundary will
cause severe, economic hardship for American fishermen.
Senator John Chafee (Republican - Rhode Island) is concerned
that many of New England's offshore fishermen will be forced
to move inshore and compete with the inshore fisher-
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men Many New England congressional members share this
concern and believe that joint fishing rights should be
restored immediately.
The immediate reaction of Canadian fishermen was
despair. The area in which they were entitled to fish had
been substantially reduced . And the area that they now could
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fish, would come under strict Canadian regulation. Although
they received an area that included 50 - 70% of the scallop
catch, the Canadian fishermen realized the free-for-all that
existed on Georges Bank was over.
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CONCLUSION
Former U.S. Department of State Geographer, Lewis
Alexander summed up the Gulf of Maine decision by saying that
the ICJ took a look at all the special circumstances of the
case and "threw them out the window. " This author agrees.
The ICJ listened to a barrage of arguments based on geology,
biology, ecology, sociology, history and economics. In the
end, however, the ICJ rejected them all and based their
decision on one criteria - mathematics. They simply divided
the disputed area in half. From Point A to the triangle, the
delimitation line very much resembles an exact dividing line.
In closing, the fundamental norm of international law
concerning the delimitation of a maritime boundary is that
the decision must be equitable. In addition, applicable
criteria and practical methods must be used in reaching an
equitable decision. However, since anyone can make a case
for the application of a special circumstance (criteria), and
anyone can make a case against it, the special circumstance
must be of significant magnitude. The ICJ proved this when
they rejected almost all of the special circumstances
proposed by Canada and the U.S. The only exception was the
small correction the Court made to account for the length of
the U.S. coastline (proportionality) in the Gulf of Maine - a
special circumstance of significant magnitude that could not
be overlooked.
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In the future, adjacent and opposite States will think
twice before taking a maritime delimitation to the ICJ. They
would be foolish not to assume that the majority of special
circumstances would be rejected and the disputed area
divided. Nations stand a better chance of getting special
circumstances recognized in bilateral negotiations, rather
than to include a third party. It is true that the ICJ would
treat the delimitation properly, applying the norm of
international customary law - but in many cases an equitable
decision based on special circumstances will turn out to be
an equal division.
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